Book Review: Whitaker Prize Selection
Charles D. Ameringer. The Cuban Democratic Experience: The Auténtico Years, 1944-1952. Gainesville: U P of Florida, 2000. 230 pp. ISBN: 0-8130-1755-6 (alk. Paper)
Review by Judy B. McInnis
University of Delaware
In this book, winner of the 2001 MACLAS Whitaker Prize, Charles D. Ameringer brings a full scholarly apparatus to bear on an important eight-year period of Cuban history. His well-written, analytical study should interest both the general and the specialist reader. Branching out in references to anterior and posterior developments to the auténtico years, Ameringer gives readers a good idea of the development of Cuba in the twentieth century. His research includes newspaper articles and radio broadcasts, government reports both from Cuba and the United States (State Department, Armed Forces, etc.), documents of the Organization of American States and of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor-International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, documents of the Auténtico Party, interviews with government and business leaders, as well as exhaustive incorporation of secondary sources (the work previously done on Cuba). The book is divided into ten chapters, inclusive of conclusion, and 21 pages of Notes, fives pages of Bibliography, and an Index of ten pages.
Professor Ameringer points out that the traditional division of Cuban history into the Plattist Republic (1902-1933), the Batista dictatorship (1933-1958), and the ascension of Fidel Castro (since 1959) fails to take into account these eight years of democratic rule when Ramón Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío Socarrós occupied the presidency as candidates supported by the Cuban Revolutionary Party-Auténtico (PRC-A). The Auténticos were criticized for giving too many benefits to sugarcane workers, benefits sometimes resulting in featherbedding and in stagnation of the industry. They also failed to carry through on educational reforms in rural areas, primarily because of extreme centralization of the educational system from Havana. Although their governments supported the arts and spent more than one quarter of the national budget on education, Cuba still had an illiteracy rate of 23.6% at the end of the auténtico period.
Grau was generally perceived as a man who made many promises but kept few of them. His one virtue seems to have been to respect individual liberties, including freedom of speech. Inefficiency, compounded by graft, resulted in little progress for the Cuban economy during his four years in office. His most glaring fault was inertia in his apologetic acceptance of the unfavorable terms in the U.S. Sugar Act of 1948: his “failure to press Cuba’s legitimate claim to a larger sugar quota in recognition of its contribution to victory over the Axis powers in World War II was irresponsible” (p. 73).
Fidel Castro accused Prío of operating a massive system of government patronage and payoffs to enrich himself and his family. Prío failed to act decisively to protect the Constitution and the people from a military golpe de estado in which the freedom of expression formerly enjoyed was suppressed. A major cause for the fall of Prío’s government was his failure to restore the Liberation Army to civilian control in the early years of his presidency. Batista had created a mercenary army loyal to him personally in the “Sergeants Revolt” of 1933. Prío’s blindness to the ever-present threat of an unreformed military resulted in his loss of power, once again to Batista.
Still, Prío did correct the flagrant excesses of corruption prevalent under the Grau administration. Among Prío’s efforts for reform was his attempt to diversify Cuba’s economy, but he could do little against the vested interests of the sugarcane growers and the United States’ favored status as exporter of goods to Cuba. He did succeed in giving some protection to Cuba’s incipient textile industry and in “negotiating trade treaties with England, Canada, and Germany” (p. 136). Still imports from the United States remained above 75%.
Ameringer contends that the Auténticos lost power precisely because of their success in carrying out their policies of maintaining “a highly regulated economy to achieve broadly nationalistic and anti-imperialist goals” (p. 187). They “sought to eliminate latifundium and check administration cane to promote Cuban ownership of land and industry,” (p. 187). They endeavored to maintain some degree of independence from United States policy on sugarcane purchase and other agricultural products, all while abjuring the Communist philosophy.
Ameringer paints a fascinating portrait of “Crazy Eddy” Chibás, member and erstwhile critic of the Auténticos and a perennial presidential candidate. Unable to produce proof of his specific allegations of Prío’s corruption, Chibás chose martyrdom, shooting himself in the abdomen after calling upon the people to rebel in his weekly radio program. Fidel Castro, who championed Chibás’s cause, might well have been able to depose Prío on the day of the funeral, according to contemporary accounts.
Ameringer’s ability to portray the colorful protagonists of this period increases the appeal of this scholarly study. His style flows nicely, varied with colloquial phrases to describe jolting changes and insidious corruption. The book is a “must read” for those interested in Cuban history. It is especially timely now when Cuban-American relations are thawing and the end of the Castro regime is in sight.